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Abstract 
 
With corporate social responsibility (CSR) becoming more important to stakeholders and 
thus firms, understanding the relationship between CSR and corporate financial 
performance (CFP) is becoming more and more important. Although there is much 
research examining the general CSR-CFP relationship, there is very little, if any, research 
that investigates the CSR-CFP association across industries. With a sample of 429 firms 
from the S&P 500, my study looks to see if this association differs between the consumer 
and nonconsumer sectors. Time-series regression analyses reveal that while the CSR-
sales relationship is negative for both consumer and nonconsumer companies, the CSR-
gross profit association is more positive for nonconsumer than consumer firms. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I investigate the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives on the corporate financial performance (CFP) of consumer and nonconsumer 
industries. The consumer sector is comprised of business-to-consumer corporations while 
the nonconsumer sector consists of business-to-business firms. My study furthers Palmer 
(2012) who finds that CSR is negatively related to sales and positively related to gross 
profit.  
The concept and definition of CSR has been widely debated because of its 
vagueness, subjectivity, and authenticity (Sweeney and Coughlan 2008). That said, more 
and more definitions of CSR are beginning to agree with each other. The Harvard 
Kennedy School of Government defines CSR as programs that go “beyond philanthropy 
and compliance and [address] how companies manage their economic, social, and 
environmental impacts, as well as their relationships in all key spheres of influence: the 
workplace, the marketplace, the supply chain, the community, and the public policy 
realm” (The Initiative: Defining CSR). The definition Palmer (2012) provides is similar 
to this one. Citing Williams and Siegel (2001), she claims that CSR initiatives are 
“actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interest of the firm and that 
which is required by law.” In line with these two definitions, I define CSR programs as 
initiatives that positively affect local communities and society in general. Operational 
business functions and legal obligations do not comprise such initiatives. 
Just as CSR’s definition has been debated, so has its theoretical framework. A 
number of theories exist to explain the purpose and strategic implementation of CSR, 
which include the agency theory, the resource-based view of the firm, the stewardship 
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theory, and the stakeholder theory. Friedman’s (1970) agency theory asserts that CSR 
programs are typically direct results of managers’ interests that help augment their wealth 
at the cost of shareholder profits. He and others who hold this perspective believe that 
CSR programs are problematic within corporations unless they improve the economic 
well-being of the company or shareholders. This agency issue is avoided under Hart’s 
(1995) theory of the firm, which looks at CSR as a means for some companies to gain a 
competitive advantage. Contrary to the agency theory and theory of the firm, Donaldson 
and Davis’ (1991) stewardship theory argues that managers are obligated to “do the right 
thing” whether or not the economic impact is beneficial for the corporation and 
shareholders. And finally, Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder theory agrees that when 
implementing CSR programs, managers should consider other factors besides manager 
and shareholder interests. Instead, CSR initiatives should reflect the interests of other 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, and community establishments. 
Plainly, the reasons and ways to implement CSR programs are disputable. 
Although both the definition and theoretical framework have been debated, many 
agree that CSR programs can be broken up into three segments: environment, social, and 
governance (ESG). Examples of environmental initiatives are preventing pollution and 
decreasing both greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption. There are a wide 
array of social issues that CSR programs can tackle, including enhancing diversity, 
employee relations with management, and health and safety in the workplace. At the 
same time, social agendas can address human rights, product quality, charitable giving, 
and community involvement. Lastly, governance matters revolve around transparency, 
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reporting and disclosure quality, shareholder rights, and executive accountability and 
compensation (ESG Managers Portfolios). 
An excellent example of a corporation dedicated to all aspects of CSR is J. Crew 
Group, Inc., a multinational company that sells upscale clothing and accessories to 
women, men, and children. J. Crew has lessened its environmental footprint by using 
shopping bags made from 100% recycled paper, an initiative that began in 2010. Since 
shopping bags composed of recycled paper are more expensive than other types of bags 
and do not fall under ordinary business functions or legal obligations, this environmental 
initiative meets the criteria for CSR. J. Crew also helps the environment through its 
implementation of energy management systems that minimize energy consumption. 
These systems, which have been installed in all new stores since 2002 and some older 
stores, benefit not only the environment but also the company’s normal business 
operations. As stated on J. Crew’s website, “These systems help optimize and minimize 
our heating, ventilation and cooling (HVAC) and lighting usage.” Thus, although both 
the recycled shopping bags and revamped energy systems are advantageous to the 
environment, the former initiative constitutes CSR while the latter does not, an important 
distinction to make. 
The famous retail firm also spearheads social initiatives, which include its 
Responsible Sourcing Program, membership with Fair Factories Clearinghouse (FFC), 
and partnership with charities that aim to improve education conditions. The Responsible 
Sourcing Program ensures that suppliers comply with their Code of Vendor Conduct, 
which addresses child labor, forced labor, discrimination, harassment and abuse, wages 
and benefits, hours of work, freedom of association, health and safety, laws and 
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regulations, customs and security, environmental standards, subcontracting, transparency, 
and monitoring and compliance. In addition, as a member of FFC—a nonprofit 
committed to using technology and cooperation to improve the workplace—J. Crew has 
advanced collaboration with business partners, which has allowed the company’s 
operations to become more efficient. Last but not least, J. Crew partners with 
DonorsChoose.org and Teach For America to help “[foster] and [promote] safe, happy 
and effective learning environments.” Overall, by ensuring their suppliers are socially 
responsible and by teaming up with FFC and nonprofits focused on education, J. Crew 
promotes social reform. 
 In terms of governance, J. Crew advocates for transparency and executive 
accountability through its Responsible Sourcing Program discussed earlier and 
accompanying audits of suppliers. The Production team and management are required to 
attend frequent seminars that discuss J. Crew’s Responsible Sourcing necessities and the 
ways in which they can ensure their suppliers meet these requirements. A major strategy 
they use is regularly auditing suppliers who manufacture J. Crew products. These audits 
include “document reviews, private worker interviews and a walk-through of the facility. 
When appropriate…surveillance and off-site interviews” are used to inspect suppliers as 
well. In sum, while the Responsible Sourcing Program is a social-focused CSR initiative 
in that it promotes human rights, this program is also a governance-focused CSR program 
in its advancement of corporate transparency and executive accountability (J. CREW). 
J. Crew is one example of many companies nowadays engaging in high levels of 
CSR. Corporations “today are undertaking environmental and social efforts to 
complement traditional business activities, using these efforts as catalysts to improve 
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everything they do—from innovation and customer relationships to brand building and 
beyond. The results? Higher profits. Lower costs and risks. Increased shareholder value. 
Competitive advantage. And… a measurable positive impact on society and the planet” 
(Park and Koehler 2013). This emphasis on CSR has grown over the last 30 to 40 years. 
Abbott and Monsen (1979) found that 51.4% of Fortune 500 companies reported CSR 
disclosures in 1971 while 85.7% did so by 1975. The attention companies give to CSR in 
the 21st century has only increased since these findings. Beyond CSR disclosures, more 
and more companies are publishing annual CSR reports and posting CSR information on 
their websites. In a study consisting of 602 public and private firms from the U.S., 
Canada, Europe, Japan, and Australia, the amount of firms issuing CSR reports increased 
from 31% in 2009 to 40% in 2010. The percentage of corporations that display CSR 
information on their websites rose from 75% in 2009 to 81% in 2010. Plainly, CSR plays 
a larger role in firms nowadays than several decades ago (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
and Craib Design & Communications). 
Taking the stakeholder approach to CSR, it seems that companies have increased 
their level of CSR largely because stakeholder attitudes have changed. Between 1966 and 
1975, stakeholders lost confidence in American institutional leadership (Abbott and 
Monsen 1979). Following this decline in confidence, the 2001 Enron and 2002 
WorldCom scandals transpired, and the amount of corporate malpractice drastically 
increased (The Corporate Scandal Sheet). CSR serves as a means to restore diminished 
stakeholder confidence and trust in the market. Cone Communications’ telephone study 
on 1,040 Americans illustrates stakeholders’ recent augmented demand for CSR. While 
in March 2001 about 40% of Americans asserted that “A company’s commitment to 
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social issues is important when I decide which stocks/mutual funds to invest in,” around 
66% of respondents agreed with this statement by July 2002. In this same timeframe, the 
percent of respondents agreeing that “A company’s commitment to social issues is 
important when I decide which companies I want to see doing business in my 
community” increased from approximately 58% to 84% (Cone Communications). When 
taken as a whole, since CSR programs have become more valuable to stakeholders, 
corporations have placed a greater emphasis on CSR.  
With CSR becoming more important to stakeholders and thus firms, 
understanding the CSR-CFP relationship has become crucial. Managers can use CSR-
CFP information to make more informed decisions for their companies’ CSR practices, 
allowing them to better assess their returns on CSR investment. While there is much 
research examining the general CSR-CFP relation, there is very little, if any, research that 
investigates the CSR-CFP association across industries. My study looks to see if this 
association differs between the consumer and nonconsumer sectors. I hypothesize that the 
relation between improved CSR and sales is negative for consumer firms and positive for 
nonconsumer firms. My results illustrate a negative relationship for both sectors, which 
can be attributed to the high price sensitivities of buyers of consumer goods. These price 
sensitivities are reflected in nonconsumer transactions because consumer companies buy 
their goods from nonconsumer firms. In addition, I forecast that the relation between 
improved CSR and gross profit is more positive for nonconsumer firms than for 
consumer firms, which is verified in my results. CSR’s differential impact on gross profit 
can be explained through the lower price sensitivities of nonconsumer as compared to 
consumer buyers and, thus, the relatively inelastic demand in the nonconsumer sector.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Stakeholders have recently increased their demand for CSR initiatives for two 
primary reasons: (1) to restore their decreased confidence and trust in the market after a 
high level of corporate malpractice as identified in Chapter 1 and (2) to “improve their 
own identity and reputation by identifying with a corporation’s commitment to CSR 
initiatives” (Palmer 2012). This increased demand has led to an increase in CSR, leading 
one to think that these programs provide an enhanced economic return for companies. 
Although the majority of studies show this positive association, some research concludes 
otherwise. With an increase in CSR, some studies have shown CFP worsens or is not 
affected. After identifying several studies demonstrating these divergent relationships, I 
will summarize two studies illustrating ways in which CSR differs across industries. 
Finally, because my study looks at the differential impact of CSR on CFP for consumer 
and nonconsumer industries, I will examine differences in price sensitivities between 
these two sectors.  
2.1 The CSR-CFP Relationship 
2.1.1 A Null Association 
 Abbott and Monsen (1979) and Aupperle et al. (1985) found that CSR and CFP 
do not have a significant relationship, meaning a change in CSR does not substantially 
impact CFP. With a sample of 450 firms from the 1974 Fortune 500, Abbott and Monsen 
measured CSR via ratings from the Social Involvement Disclosures (SID) scale for the 
years 1964-1974. Firms with less than three CSR items on their annual reports from 1973 
to 1974 were classified as not highly involved, and firms with more than three CSR items 
were categorized as highly involved. CFP was measured by total returns to investors. 
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After statistical analysis, they concluded that higher social involvement did not augment 
investors’ total returns. 
 Aupperle et al. (1985) detected an insignificant CSR-CFP relationship after 
developing their own measure of CSR. In order to generate this CSR measurement, they 
sent out a survey to 818 CEOs in the Forbes 1981 Annual Directory. The survey 
contained four sets of 20 items that stated different ways to measure CSR. The four sets 
analyzed a distinct area of CSR—economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic—and their 
content validity and reliability were confirmed via empirical tests. The 241 CEOs that 
responded to this survey assigned up to 10 points to each item, with a 10 indicating that 
item appropriately measured CSR. Once Aupperle et al. compiled these surveys and 
produced their CSR measure, they did not find a statistically significant relationship 
between CSR and CFP, measured using short-term (one-year) and long-term (five years) 
ROA. 
There are number of reasons these two studies found a null relationship between 
CSR and CFP. First and foremost, there is no clear and accepted CSR measurement. As 
stated by Parket and Eilbirt (1975), “There are, as yet, no accounting techniques, 
analytical tools, or statistical methods which will objectively differentiate companies that 
are socially responsible from those that are not. To measure degrees of social 
responsibility would be an even more ethereal task.” Second, confounding variables may 
exist and stakeholders may not be aware of companies’ CSR initiatives. If firms do not 
successfully inform stakeholders of their CSR programs, then there is no way of 
determining if CSR influences stakeholders’ decisions and., subsequently, companies’ 
CFP (Ullmann 1985). 
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2.1.2 A Negative Association 
 The research of Vance (1975) and Lopez et al. (2007) demonstrated a negative 
association between CSR and CFP. Vance’s study reexamined Moskowitz’s (1972) 
previous CSR-CFP findings, one of the earliest discoveries in this area of research. 
Moskowitz looked at 14 socially responsible companies. He never explained why or how 
he chose these companies, which serves as a limitation. Nevertheless, as editor of the first 
issue of Business and Society, he advised investment in these “securities…on the basis of 
corporate behavior that can be considered socially responsive.” Six months later, the 
stock prices went up by an average of 7.28%, as compared to the 4.4% increase for Dow-
Jones, 5.1% increase for the New York Stock Exchange, and 6.4% increase for Standard 
and Poors Industrials. Because the stock prices of his suggested securities increased, 
Moskowitz concluded a positive relationship between CSR and CFP existed. 
 Vance challenged Moskowitz’s simplistic exploratory research. Using the same 
sample, he extended the short timeframe analyzed from 1972 to 1975. Vance found that 
stock prices for all firms dropped and, in fact, much more than did the returns for Dow-
Jones, New York Stock Exchange, and Standard and Poors. To further confirm the 
negative relationship between CSR and CFP, Vance looked at 95 companies whose level 
of CSR had been reported in Business and Society Review in 1974. While 45 companies’ 
CSR ratings came from surveys completed by corporate staffers, 50 companies’ CSR 
ratings came from business students’ survey responses. With these ratings, Vance found a 
negative relationship between high socially responsible firms and CFP as measured by 
share price. 
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 Lopez et al. (2007) did run regressions and, in the end, found a statistically 
significant negative CSR-CFP association. To come to this conclusion, they looked at 
two groups of 55 companies for two periods: 1999-2001 and 2002-2004. The first group 
of firms belonged to the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) because they had 
implemented the necessary level of sustainability practices. The second group had not 
adopted sufficient sustainability initiatives and, as a result, did not belong to the DJSI. 
CSR was measured by whether or not the firms in this study belonged to the DJSI. CFP 
was measured using profit/loss before taxes. After controlling for size, risk, and industry, 
Lopez et al. (2007) found a negative relationship between CSR and CFP for both time 
periods. The explanation the researchers provided for this negative relationship, which 
Vance would support, was that CSR activity “involves a cost or reallocation of resources 
that negatively affects the firm’s performance.” They asserted, “The expenses can be 
greater than the incremental revenue that these measures generate.” 
2.1.3 A Positive Association 
 Finally, Heinz (1976) and Orlitzky et al. (2003) found a positive association 
between CSR and CFP. Heinz’s sample consisted of 29 big companies, which served as 
his study’s key limitation. He measured CSR using a reputational scale that was 
developed from business students’ responses to a Business and Society Review CSR 
survey. His methodology for measuring CSR essentially mimicked the methodology 
Vance utilized in the second half of his study. Although they measured CSR similarly, 
Heinz found a significant positive association between CSR and return on equity (ROE). 
Factors contributing to these divergent results may include different time periods, 
companies in their sample, sample size, and measures of CFP. 
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 The meta-analysis of 52 studies investigating the CSR-CFP relationship that 
Orlitzky et al. (2003) has conducted offers one of the most recent and comprehensive 
studies in this field. This study referred to CSR as corporate social performance (CSP). 
With 33,878 observations and a time period of 30 years, this meta-analytic review found 
that “corporate virtue in the form of social responsibility and, to a lesser extent, 
environmental responsibility is likely to pay off.” Orlitzky et al. (2003) also discovered 
that CSR is more positively related to accounting rather than market measures of CFP. 
The researchers used the instrumental stakeholder theory, which maintains that meeting 
the interests and needs of a variety of stakeholders is instrumental for a corporation’s 
financial success, as a way to explain this positive association (Donaldson and Preston 
1995). With this theory in mind and the increasing demand of CSR by various 
stakeholders, it follows that CSR and CFP are positively associated (Orlitzky et al. 2003). 
When companies boost their CSR presence, they enhance their brand and reputation. This 
improved corporate image could provide them with the ability to boost their prices, 
attract better employees, increase their customer base, and decrease business risk. At the 
same time, CSR programs can decrease operating costs in the long-term (Palmer 2012). 
2.2 CSR Differences Across Industries 
 Several studies have argued that studying CSR is incomplete and somewhat 
useless if industries are not accounted for because the dynamics of CSR are so distinct 
across industries. Sweeney and Coughlan (2011) and Robertson and Nicholson (1996) 
successfully illustrate how CSR differs across industries. Sweeney and Coughlan 
identified six potential stakeholders— customers, employees, suppliers, shareholders, the 
environment, and the community—and examined which stakeholders were addressed in 
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the annual and CSR reports of 28 FTSE4Good companies in December 2004. The 
FTSE4Good firms belonged to a stock market index based on certain CSR criteria and 
created by the FTSE Group, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange 
Group. The selected companies represented a broad range of industries, including 
financial services, pharmaceutical (medical), pharmaceutical (health & beauty), 
telecommunications, automobile, oil & gas, and retail. Upon analysis, they concluded 
“that the industry the firm operates within should have a significant effect on the 
stakeholders addressed in the firm’s annual report.” For example, while firms in the 
telecommunications industry indorsed CSR initiatives focused on customers and 
employees, those in the automobile industry spearheaded CSR programs geared towards 
the environment. On the other hand, corporations in financial services addressed 
customers, employees, and communities via CSR practices, and pharmaceutical firms 
promoted CSR activity focused on customers, employees, communities, and 
shareholders. 
Robertson and Nicholson (1996) found that industry influences not only the type 
of CSR programs implemented but also how they are disclosed to the public. To reach 
these conclusions, they sent out a detailed survey asking questions regarding social 
responsibility disclosure to 1,000 CEOs. These CEOs were selected from a database 
according to their company’s size and industry traits. In addition to the survey, they asked 
for “one example of a mission statement, annual report or other corporate communication 
dealing with these [social responsibility issues.” Ultimately, 299 responded to the surveys 
and 118 of the 299 sent some type of firm document. All 299 companies analyzed 
belonged to the following industries: chemicals; construction; distribution and retail; 
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energy; engineering; financial services; food, drink and tobacco products; newspapers; 
pharmaceuticals; publishing; radio and television; textiles; water; and other services. 
While chemical and pharmaceutical firms promoted employee-focused CSR 
initiatives (since their success depends on highly skilled workers), food, drink, and 
tobacco and newspaper industries advanced consumer-focused CSR programs, primarily 
via product quality. Also, a majority of firms in this study emphasized the environment as 
a stakeholder. However, companies in other industries such as the water industry had 
more extensive environment-focused CSR programs, and their disclosure was more 
specific. Rather than a generic statement such as “Our firm remains committed to 
safeguarding the environment while providing safe, secure, efficient, economic products 
to meet the needs of our customers,” companies in environment-related industries would 
describe a more impactful, particular initiative in detail. In total, the two studies discussed 
show that companies tailor the area of CSR they focus on and the manner in which they 
report on CSR toward their respective industry’s stakeholders. 
2.3 Price Sensitivities 
 Since (1) it has been demonstrated that stakeholders and thus CSR differ across 
industries and (2) my study looks at the CSR-CFP relationship between consumer and 
nonconsumer industries, it is necessary to discuss the distinct price sensitivities of 
consumer and nonconsumer stakeholders, or buyers. The divergent price sensitivities are 
crucial to my hypotheses and conclusion. Although pricing dynamics for the 
nonconsumer sector is under-researched, it is a widely accepted microeconomics theory 
that consumer buyers are more price sensitive than nonconsumer buyers (Reid and Plank 
2004). This means that demand for consumer goods is elastic: if prices go up for one 
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consumer firm, then the buyer can purchase less of that consumer firm’s goods or buy 
essentially the same goods from another consumer company. Switching sellers is more 
difficult for nonconsumer companies, and thus demand for their products is more 
inelastic. If a nonconsumer corporation raises its prices, their buyers—who are consumer 
companies and other nonconsumer companies—will generally accept this price increase. 
This is partly due to the fact that nonconsumer consumers “use formalized, lengthy 
purchasing policies and processes” and typically buy infrequently in bulk. On the other 
hand, consumer buyers buy small quantities on a regular basis generally “on impulse or 
with minimal processes” (Brassington and Petitt 148). In sum, the consumer industry is 
characterized by a more elastic demand and more price sensitive buyers; the 
nonconsumer industry is characterized by a more inelastic demand and less price 
sensitive buyers.  
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES 
As stated earlier, this study extends Palmer (2012) who analyzed the CSR-CFP 
relationship for 333 companies in the S&P 500 between 2001 and 2005. CFP was 
measured using the ratios sales/assets, sales/employees, and gross profit. I extend her 
research by examining the differential impact of CSR on CFP for consumer and 
nonconsumer firms. For consistency and comparability purposes, my study uses the same 
ratios to measure CFP. 
Currently, there is minimal, if any, research that looks to see if the CSR-CFP 
relationship differs across industries. There is, however, research showing that the focus-
area and disclosure of CSR programs depend on industries (Robertson and Nicholson 
1996; Sweeney and Coughlan 2011). These industry differences have been attributed to 
stakeholder differences (Donaldson and Preston 1995). In line with the stakeholder theory 
discussed earlier, companies target their most important stakeholders in their CSR 
initiatives, whether they are customers, employees, or the environment to name a few. 
Taking into consideration these demonstrated industry differences, I hypothesize that 
CSR will have a differential impact on CFP for consumer and nonconsumer firms. 
H1: The relationship between improved CSR and sales is negative for consumer firms 
and positive for nonconsumer firms. 
 The different price sensitivities and behaviors of buyers of consumer and 
nonconsumer goods help support this hypothesis. Buyers of consumer products are more 
price sensitive than those of nonconsumer products (Brassington and Petitt 148). As a 
result, when a consumer company spends money on CSR programs and consequently 
increases their goods’ prices, some individuals will most likely (1) buy less of that good 
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or (2) buy the same amount of that good from another company. Both scenarios lead to 
decreased sales, but not necessarily a decrease in gross profit. I believe these price 
sensitivities should hold for both industries of the consumer sector: consumer staple and 
consumer discretionary. While people need staple goods (which include items such as 
food, beverages, and household items) to live, they may still choose to decrease the 
amount of staple goods they buy or switch vendors if the CSR premium gets too high. 
The demand for consumer discretionary goods is by nature more elastic than the demand 
for consumer staple goods. By definition, elastic demand is the result of high price 
sensitivities of buyers. Such dynamics would be supported by Palmer (2012), who found 
that “some customers are willing to pay a higher price for the products/services of 
socially responsible firms, but that fewer customers are willing to buy the products.” 
Further, I forecast that sales will actually increase for nonconsumer corporations 
as their CSR improves because their customer base (consumer and other nonconsumer 
firms) will increase. The foundation for this prediction is the importance of brand to 
corporations’ success (AllBusiness.com) and the increased demand from consumer 
consumers for CSR programs (Cone Communications). In order to enhance their brand 
and thus consumer loyalty, I predict that consumer companies will buy more from 
nonconsumer companies with well-established CSR programs rather than those without 
such programs. J. Crew’s Responsible Sourcing Program discussed in Chapter 1 is an 
excellent example of this hypothesized trend. J. Crew is a consumer company that 
ensures they do business with socially responsible nonconsumer firms. This transaction 
trickles down to their consumer transactions and thus financial success by improving 
their brand. Then, as consumer companies give more business to socially responsible 
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nonconsumer firms, nonconsumer firms will be compelled to do business with socially 
responsible nonconsumer companies as well. This domino effect will cause nonconsumer 
firms with higher levels of CSR to gain more of both consumer and nonconsumer 
customers. Subsequently, they will experience higher sales. 
H2: The relationship between improved CSR and gross profit is more positive for 
nonconsumer firms than for consumer firms. 
Before establishing this hypothesis, I confirmed that CSR and profitability, as 
measured by return on assets (ROA), are positively related for both consumer and 
nonconsumer companies (Table 1). That said, this positive relationship is insignificant for 
consumer companies and significant at the p<0.05 level for nonconsumer companies. 
Considering this positive association and Palmer’s results, I recognized that CSR and 
gross profit are positively associated for both consumer and nonconsumer firms. That 
said, should H1 be true, the relationship between CSR and gross profit percentage should 
be more positive for nonconsumer firms: they are selling more goods at a higher price. 
Should H1 be false, I still believe that the relationship between improved CSR and gross 
profit percentage is more positive for nonconsumer firms than for consumer firms. This 
prediction is due to the nature of nonconsumer activity and the price sensitivities of 
nonconsumer buyers. Irrespective of how high prices go, nonconsumer buyers need the 
goods supplied by nonconsumer firms in order to manage their own business and make a 
profit. They do not have the option to completely stop buying from nonconsumer 
companies, unless they have gone bankrupt and are going out of business. Buyers of 
consumer products, on the other hand, do have this option. Because demand for 
nonconsumer products is more inelastic than for consumer products, for the same 
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increase in CSR, a nonconsumer corporation should experience a larger increase in gross 
profit than does a consumer company (Brassington and Petitt 148). 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The total sample is composed of 429 firms (Appendix 1) that belong to the MSCI 
ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) STATS 2000-2004 data set, which will be 
further explained in section 4.2, and whose 2001-2005 financial data was available on the 
financial database COMPUSTAT. (In order to investigate how improved CSR relates to 
CFP, 2000-2004 CSR data and 2001-2005 CFP data were evaluated.) As an extension of 
Palmer (2012), this study analyzed only the S&P 500 corporations from the full dataset. 
While Palmer narrowed her dataset by eliminating companies without ESG data for all 
the years in the investigated time frame, my study kept these firms. Since this study is 
relational rather than longitudinal, it made sense to keep these firms.  
The 429 firms were divided into consumer and nonconsumer groups based on 
their global industry classification (GIC) developed by MSCI. The consumer group 
consisted of 96 companies (31 consumer discretionary firms and 65 consumer staple 
firms); the nonconsumer group consisted of 333 companies. Table 2 displays the sub-
industries in these consumer and nonconsumer groups, as well as their CSR descriptive 
statistics. With these groups, I investigate the differential impact of CSR on CFP for 
consumer versus nonconsumer companies. 
4.2 Independent, Dependent, and Control Variables  
For both hypotheses, CSR serves as the independent variable. CSR is measured 
using the MSCI ESG STATS database, which is considered one of the most 
comprehensive measurements of CSR. This database accounts for a variety of CSR 
initiatives using a number of different sources. CSR is divided into seven categories: 
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environment, community, human rights, employee relations, diversity, product, and 
governance. If sources illustrate CSR involvement in a certain category, companies 
receive a 1 in that category; if they show a lack of CSR involvement, that category is 
allotted a 0. The sources evaluated to come to these conclusions include corporate 
documents (i.e. annual reports and CSR reports), internal CSR surveys from companies’ 
investor-relations departments, external CSR surveys, and press reports to name a few 
(Waddock and Graves 1997).  
Beyond considering CSR strengths, the MSCI ESG Index investigates CSR 
weaknesses to control for the criticism that CSR programs are implemented to conceal 
their unethical practices from important stakeholders. If CSR weaknesses are detected, 
companies are assigned a 1 in the respective categories; if weaknesses are not detected, 
companies are assigned a 0. I also took into consideration CSR strengths and weaknesses 
in my CSR measure by creating a total CSR score that equals 100 plus CSR strengths 
minus CSR weaknesses. A base of 100 was necessary in order to avoid negative CSR 
scores.  
The dependent variable—CFP—is measured in three different ways: sales/assets, 
sales/employees, and gross profit percentage. These ratios were chosen for consistency in 
extending Palmer (2012). At the same time, I was particularly interested in examining the 
association between CSR and sales because there is less information on this relationship 
as compared to the CSR-profitability relationship. Most past CSR-CFP studies have used 
return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and return on equity (ROE) to measure 
CFP. Both my study and Palmer (2012) look into a different area of CFP. 
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In order to test my hypotheses, I created an indicator variable that separated my 
companies into their consumer and nonconsumer groups. An additional indicator variable 
was used to distribute the consumer group into consumer staple and consumer 
discretionary sub-industries. By making this second indicator variable, later statistical 
analysis could determine if CSR affected the sub-industries of the consumer sector 
differently. Before running statistical tests, I normalized total CSR scores and control 
variables. The control variables included long-term debt/total assets, total sales, and 
number of employees. While long-term debt/total assets and controlled for company risk, 
total sales and number of employees controlled for company size. Company size is a 
crucial variable to control for because large companies have bigger budgets and resources 
than small companies. As a result, it is common for big-sized companies to engage in 
more CSR activities (Udayasankar 2007). Both the total CSR scores and control variables 
are lagged in the H1 and H2 regression models, displayed in section 4.3. 
4.3 Statistical Analysis 
 As stated in section 4.1, my statistical analysis used 2000-2004 CSR data to form 
the independent variable and 2001-2005 CFP data to construct the dependent and control 
variables. Using lagged CSR data was necessary to assess how improved CSR is 
associated with CFP. To determine if improved CSR is negatively related to sales for 
consumer firms and positively related to sales for nonconsumer firms, the H1 model 
displayed on the next page was used. CFP was measured using the ratios sales/assets and 
sales/employees. I ran this regression four times for the four industry groups I initially 
created: consumer, consumer staple, consumer discretionary, and nonconsumer. The 
results are shown in Table 4. 
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H1 Model: 
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For both H1 and H2, I generated an interaction variable with the nonconsumer 
dummy variable and lagged CSR score. This new independent variable and nonconsumer 
dummy variable were added to the original H1 model, as displayed in the new H2 model 
below. With CFP being measured by sales/assets, sales/employees, and gross profit 
percentage, the marginal effect of CSR on these three CFP measurements for consumer 
versus nonconsumer firms could be analyzed. Thus, this updated model could effectively 
evaluate if the relationship between improved CSR and gross profit percentage is more 
positive for nonconsumer than consumer companies, as predicted in H2. The results are 
shown in Table 5. 
H2 Model: 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics for the consumer and nonconsumer sectors, as well as for the 
complete 429 sample are displayed in Table 3. To see the industries in the consumer and 
nonconsumer sectors along with their average, minimum, and maximum CSR score, refer 
back to Table 2. A CSR score below 100 indicates more CSR weaknesses than strengths 
while a CSR score above 100 indicates more CSR strengths than weaknesses. When 
looking at the consumer staple industry, only one out of the three sub-industries—
household products—has a CSR score above 100.  For consumer discretionary, this 
amount increases to three out of the five sub-industries, or 60%. Finally, for the 
nonconsumer sector, the number of sub-industries with a CSR greater than 100 is four out 
of eight, or 50%. Ultimately, the range of minimum, average, and maximum CSR scores 
across the industries illustrates the industry effect on the implementation of CSR 
programs. 
 Returning to the correlation matrices presented in Table 1, they not only confirm 
the positive relationship between CSR and ROA, which was vital for developing H2, but 
also provide useful information for analyzing the association between CSR and 
sales/assets, sales/employees, and gross profit percentage for the nonconsumer and 
consumer sectors. For consumer firms, improved CSR is negatively associated with 
sales/employees at the p < 0.05 level and positively associated with gross profit 
percentage at the p < 0.05 level. The relationship between CSR and sales/assets is 
negative and insignificant. Although CSR and the CFP variables are related in the same 
direction for nonconsumer companies as they are for consumer companies, the 
association is more significant for nonconsumer companies. For nonconsumer firms, 
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improved CSR is negatively related to sales/assets and sales/employees at the p < 0.001 
level and positively related to gross profit at the p < 0.001 level. 
 Regarding the regression analysis, Table 4 and Table 5 show that some support 
was found for H1, and Table 5 alone demonstrates that support was found for H2. 
H1: The relationship between improved CSR and sales is negative for consumer firms 
and positive for nonconsumer firms. 
Table 4 shows that the relationship between CSR and sales is negative for both 
consumer and nonconsumer companies. For consumer companies, a 10-point increase in 
CSR score (i.e. 95 to 105) leads to a decrease in $6.81 of sales per employee in a year at 
the p < 0.01 level. The relationship between CSR and sales/assets for consumer 
companies is negative but insignificant. This can be attributed to the fact that the CSR-
sales/assets relationship is positive for consumer staple firms and negative for consumer 
discretionary firms. Regarding nonconsumer companies, both sales ratios are negatively 
related to improved CSR at the p < 0.001 level. While a 10-point increase in CSR score 
leads to a 2.8% decrease in sales for every dollar in assets, this same increase leads to a 
decrease in $15.82 of sales per employee in a year. In the end, the regressions involving 
the interaction variable show that the negative relationship between CSR and 
sales/employees is not significantly different between consumer and nonconsumer 
companies (Table 5).  
With both consumer and nonconsumer sectors experiencing a negative 
relationship between CSR and sales, the price sensitivity argument presented earlier for 
the consumer case holds while the corporate branding argument for the nonconsumer 
case does not. To recap the consumer scenario, buyers of consumer goods are more price 
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sensitive than buyers of nonconsumer goods. As a result, when consumer corporations 
raise prices in order to fund CSR initiatives, many of their buyers will either (1) buy less 
of that good or (2) buy the same amount of that good from another firm. Both actions 
beget fewer sales for these consumer companies.  
With regards to the nonconsumer sector, I originally proposed that improved CSR 
is positively related to sales because the customer base of socially responsible 
nonconsumer companies would increase. This increase would be due to the heightened 
importance of CSR to buyers of consumer goods. In response to these buyers’ augmented 
CSR demand, consumer companies would buy from more socially responsible 
nonconsumer corporations to improve their brand and, thus, customer relations. As 
consumer companies do more business with socially responsible nonconsumer 
corporations, nonconsumer companies would also do more business with nonconsumer 
firms highly involved in CSR. However, my results show a negative association between 
CSR and sales for the nonconsumer sector. This negative CSR-sales relationship suggests 
that although those who buy consumer products have claimed that they greatly value 
CSR in making buying decisions, their actions demonstrate otherwise. The price 
sensitivities discussed for the first part of H1 override these individuals’ social interest. 
 The world’s largest retailer, Walmart, successfully exemplifies that many 
consumers value low prices more than slightly higher prices in return for CSR. For many 
years, Walmart has come under scrutiny for CSR mishaps. The Los Angeles Alliance for 
a New Economy (LAANE), an organization established in 1993 essentially to promote 
CSR in economic and business endeavors, identified some of these mishaps. LAANE 
discovered that employees of Walmart receive salaries that are 20% lower than that of the 
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average retailer worker. Also, while about 67% of employees working for large 
employers like Walmart are enrolled in health insurance plans, less than half of Walmart 
employees are registered for such plans. Even more, as stated by UC Berkeley labor 
policy specialist Steven Pitts who participated in LAANE’s Walmart investigation, “Our 
research found that when Wal-Mart comes into any area, it reduces earnings of the 
community by 1.3% and the worst affected are black workers and others of color” (as 
cited in Gogoi). All these CSR weaknesses considered, Walmart still remains the world’s 
largest retailer with the slogan “Save Money. Live Better.”  
With the actions of consumer goods’ buyers placing more weight on lower prices 
rather than CSR, CSR may not have as big of an impact on corporate brand as one may 
think. Consequently, consumer companies may not feel compelled to pay more to do 
business with socially responsible nonconsumer firms. As consumer companies do less 
business with nonconsumer firms engaged in high levels of CSR, nonconsumer 
companies will buy less from socially responsible nonconsumer companies in order to 
save money. This in turn, will cause the customer base of the nonconsumer sector –which 
includes consumer and other nonconsumer companies—to decrease. 
H2: The relationship between improved CSR and gross profit is more positive for 
nonconsumer firms than for consumer firms. 
Although limited support was found for H1, overwhelming support was found for 
H2. As demonstrated in Table 5, the relationship between CSR and gross profit 
percentage is 0.014 more positive for nonconsumer corporations as compared to 
consumer firms at the p < 0.001 level. Because the results for H1 revealed a negative 
association between CSR and sales for the nonconsumer sector, this more positive CSR-
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gross profit relationship cannot be due to increased sales. Instead, this difference can be 
attributed to the price sensitivities of nonconsumer companies’ buyers and the nature of 
the nonconsumer industry’s activity. Buyers of nonconsumer products are less price 
sensitive than buyers of consumer products because their businesses cannot function 
without goods bought from other nonconsumer firms and because they have a larger 
budget (Brassington and Petitt 148). Nonconsumer companies can therefore charge 
higher CSR premiums than can consumer companies. At the same time, even if the CSR 
premium charged by consumer and nonconsumer companies is the same, nonconsumer 
companies should lose fewer customers than consumer firms because consumer firms’ 
buyers can more freely decide to buy less of certain goods, or even stop buying goods 
outright. As stated earlier, those who buy from nonconsumer corporations cannot behave 
in this manner because they need a certain level of goods for business operations. They 
are also typically locked into long-term contracts, and switching suppliers can often be a 
costly, complicated process. The ability of nonconsumer companies to charge higher 
CSR premiums and lose less customers in charging these premiums results in a more 
positive CSR-gross profit relationship for nonconsumer rather than consumer 
corporations.  
A couple of H1 and H2 sensitivity tests came to similar conclusions. Because the 
discussed results normalized the total CSR scores and control variables, the first 
sensitivity test looked at the H1 and H2 models without normalizing these variables. In 
the H1 model, the direction and significance of the relationship between CSR and 
sales/assets are identical for the consumer and nonconsumer sectors with or without 
normalization. While the direction of the association between CSR and sales/employees 
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was the same for the consumer and nonconsumer industries, the significance levels were 
different. The consumer industry’s normalized results were at the p < 0.01 level and not 
normalized results were at the p < 0.001 level; the nonconsumer industry’s normalized 
results were at the p < 0.001 and not normalized results were at the p < 0.01 level. In 
addition, the H2 model without normalization found that the relationship between CSR 
and gross profit percentage is 0.013 more positive for nonconsumer companies as 
compared to consumer corporations at the p < 0.01 level. When compared to the 
normalized results, the direction of the relationship is the same while the significance 
level is slightly lower. 
The second sensitivity test eliminated all companies that did not have CSR data 
from the MSCI ESG Index for the entire timeframe of 2000 to 2004 and returned to 
normalizing the total CSR scores and control variables. Despite the fact that this study is 
relational and not longitudinal, Palmer (2012) removed these firms from her study and, 
thus, I wanted to investigate the effects of doing so in my research. Regarding H1, the 
direction and significance of the relationship between CSR and the two sales 
measurements are the same for the consumer and nonconsumer groups under the 
conditions of this sensitivity test as compared to the conditions of my research. The only 
exception is the relationship between CSR and sales/employees in the nonconsumer 
sector. While my study found that a 10-point increase in CSR score leads to a decrease in 
$15.82 of sales per employee in a year at the p < 0.001 level for the nonconsumer 
industry, this sensitivity test calculated an insignificant decrease in $3.93 of sales per 
employee in a year. Finally, like the H2 model without normalization, this H2 model  
with normalization and a narrowed sample found that the relationship between CSR and 
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gross profit percentage is 0.013 more positive for nonconsumer companies as compared 
to consumer corporations at the p < 0.01 level. Taking both sensitivity tests into 
consideration, my study’s results and conclusions are robust to alternative assumptions. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 When taken as a whole, my study shows that CSR has a differential impact on 
CFP for consumer and nonconsumer industry sectors. While the CSR-sales relationship is 
negative for consumer and nonconsumer companies, the CSR-gross profit association is 
more positive for nonconsumer than consumer firms. The negative CSR-sales association 
for consumer companies can be explained by the high price sensitivities of these 
corporations’ buyers. When consumer firms increase their prices in order to fund their 
CSR programs, individuals will either (1) buy less of that good or (2) buy the same 
amount of that good from another company. Although recent surveys and studies have 
shown that CSR is becoming increasingly important to consumers’ buying decisions, my 
results suggest otherwise. It seems that these buyers’ price sensitivities override their 
desire for CSR. Perhaps, then, consumer companies’ brands may not benefit from CSR 
programs as much as many think.  Subsequently, consumer firms may be doing business 
with less socially responsible nonconsumer firms in order to save money. This dynamic 
can cause less nonconsumer firms to buy from other nonconsumer companies with high 
CSR premiums attached to their goods, leading to a decrease in consumer and 
nonconsumer customers for socially responsible nonconsumer corporations. 
 Though sales decrease for consumer and nonconsumer companies as their CSR 
improves, gross profit for both types of firms increases. The relationship between 
improved CSR and gross profit is more positive for nonconsumer than consumer 
companies. The greater magnitude of this increase cannot be due to increased sales, as 
originally predicted. Instead, the more positive CSR-gross profit relationship can be 
attributed to the inelastic demand of nonconsumer products as compared to the elastic 
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demand of consumer companies’ goods. Due to these elasticity differences, more buyers 
of nonconsumer than consumer products will accept a CSR premium. Even more, 
nonconsumer companies should be able to charge a higher CSR premium. Therefore, the 
gross profit of nonconsumer firms benefits more from improved CSR than does the gross 
profit of consumer firms. 
 These conclusions contribute to prior studies examining the CSR-CFP 
relationship, which is an area of research that provides valuable information to managers 
who make funding decisions for their companies’ CSR programs. Many of these studies 
have investigated the general impact of CSR on CFP using a number of measurements for 
these two variables. This study extends past research by looking at the industry effect of 
CSR on CFP. The results from this research suggest that the association between 
improved CSR and CFP does differ across industries. Nonconsumer corporations benefit 
more from CSR programs that consumer firms. Although both sectors experience 
decreased sales with improved CSR, the nonconsumer sector experiences a greater degree 
of improved profitability with increases in CSR than does the consumer sector. This is 
due to the fact that nonconsumer companies can charge higher CSR premiums or lose 
fewer customers as they charge these premiums than do consumer firms, or both.  
While this study has shown the divergent CSR-CFP association based on industry 
(the consumer and nonconsumer sectors), breaking down these sectors into more narrow 
industries would be an interesting topic for future research. Another aspect of the CSR-
CFP that needs to be further analyzed is the immediate impact of CSR on CFP versus the 
long-term effect. It would also be worthwhile to see if certain types of CSR reporting 
have a more substantial impact on CFP, as well as to control for transparency when 
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studying the CSR-CFP association.  Finally, this field of research would greatly benefit 
from a clearer, more universal measure of CSR by enhancing the validity and 
comparability of studies. Hence, while informative research exists on the relationship 
between CSR and CFP, there are still more questions concerning this relationship that 
need to be answered.  
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Appendix 1: Sample 
  Company Name Ticker 
1 Agilent Technologies, Inc. A 
2 Alcoa, Inc. AA 
3 Apple Computer, Inc. AAPL 
4 AmeriSourceBergen Corporation ABC 
5 Abbott Laboratories ABT 
6 Ace Limited ACE 
7 Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. ACS 
8 Alberto-Culver Company ACV 
9 Adobe Systems Incorporated ADBE 
10 ADC Telecommunications, Inc. ADCT 
11 Analog Devices, Inc. ADI 
12 Archer-Daniels-Midland Company ADM 
13 Automatic Data Processing, Inc. ADP 
14 Autodesk, Inc. ADSK 
15 Ameren Corporation AEE 
16 American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP 
17 AES Corporation AES 
18 Aetna, Inc. AET 
19 AFLAC, Inc. AFL 
20 Allergan, Inc. AGN 
21 American International Group, Inc. AIG 
22 Apartment Investment And Management Company AIV 
23 Allstate Corporation (The) ALL 
24 Altera Corporation ALTR 
25 American Greetings Corporation AM 
26 Applied Materials, Inc. AMAT 
27 Applied Micro Circuits Corporation AMCC 
28 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. AMD 
29 Amgen Inc. AMGN 
30 AutoNation, Inc. AN 
31 Andrew Corporation ANDW 
32 Apache Corporation APA 
33 Anadarko Petroleum Corporation APC 
34 Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. APD 
35 Ashland Inc. ASH 
36 Archstone-Smith Trust ASN 
37 Allegheny Technologies Incorporated ATI 
38 Avon Products, Inc. AVP 
39 Avery Dennison Corporation AVY 
40 Allied Waste Industries, Inc. AW 
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41 American Express Company AXP 
42 Allegheny Energy, Inc. AYE 
43 AutoZone, Inc. AZO 
44 Boeing Company BA 
45 Bank of America Corporation BAC 
46 Baxter International, Inc. BAX 
47 Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. BBBY 
48 BB&T Corporation BBT 
49 Best Buy Company, Inc. BBY 
50 Brunswick Corporation BC 
51 Bard (C.R.), Inc. BCR 
52 Black & Decker Corporation BDK 
53 Becton Dickinson and Company BDX 
54 Franklin Resources, Inc. BEN 
55 Biogen, Inc. BGEN 
56 Baker Hughes Inc. BHI 
57 Biogen Idec Inc. BIIB 
58 BJ Services Company BJS 
59 Bank of New York Company, Inc. (The) BK 
60 Ball Corporation BLL 
61 BellSouth Corporation BLS 
62 BMC Software, Inc. BMC 
63 Bemis Company, Inc. BMS 
64 Bristol-Myers Squibb Company BMY 
65 Broadcom Corporation BRCM 
66 Boston Scientific Corporation BSX 
67 Citigroup Inc. C 
68 Computer Associates International, Inc. CA 
69 ConAgra Foods, Inc. CAG 
70 Cardinal Health, Inc. CAH 
71 Caterpillar Inc. CAT 
72 Chubb Corporation CB 
73 Cooper Industries, Inc. CBE 
74 Compass Bancshares, Inc. CBSS 
75 Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. CCE 
76 Carnival Corporation, Inc. CCL 
77 Clear Channel Communications, Inc. CCU 
78 Constellation Energy Group CEG 
79 Chiron Corporation CHIR 
80 CIGNA Corporation CI 
81 CIENA Corporation CIEN 
82 Cincinnati Financial Corporation CINF 
83 CIT Group, Inc. CIT 
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84 Colgate-Palmolive Company CL 
85 Clorox Company CLX 
86 Comerica Incorporated CMA 
87 Comcast Corporation CMCSA 
88 Cummins, Inc. CMI 
89 CMS Energy Corporation CMS 
90 Comverse Technology, Inc. CMVT 
91 CenterPoint Energy, Inc. CNP 
92 Conexant Systems, Inc. CNXT 
93 Capital One Financial Corporation COF 
94 Coach, Inc. COH 
95 Rockwell Collins COL 
96 ConocoPhillips COP 
97 Costco Wholesale Corporation COST 
98 Campbell Soup Company CPB 
99 Calpine Corporation CPN 
100 Compuware Corporation CPWR 
101 Crane Co. CR 
102 Computer Sciences Corporation CSC 
103 Cisco Systems, Inc. CSCO 
104 CSX Corporation CSX 
105 Cintas Corporation CTAS 
106 Cooper Tire and Rubber Company CTB 
107 CenturyTel, Inc. CTL 
108 Citrix Systems, Inc. CTXS 
109 Convergys Corporation CVG 
110 CVS Corporation CVS 
111 ChevronTexaco Corporation CVX 
112 Dominion Resources, Inc. D 
113 Delta Air Lines, Inc. DAL 
114 DuPont Company DD 
115 Dillard's, Inc. DDS 
116 Deere & Company DE 
117 Dell Computer Corporation DELL 
118 Dollar General Corporation DG 
119 Quest Diagnostics, Inc. DGX 
120 Danaher Corporation DHR 
121 Disney, Walt Company (The) DIS 
122 Dow Jones & Company DJ 
123 Deluxe Corporation DLX 
124 Dover Corporation DOV 
125 Dow Chemical Company DOW 
126 Darden Restaurants, Inc. DRI 
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127 DTE Energy Company DTE 
128 Duke Energy Corporation DUK 
129 Devon Energy Corporation DVN 
130 Dynegy Inc. DYN 
131 eBay, Inc. EBAY 
132 Ecolab Inc. ECL 
133 Consolidated Edison Inc. ED 
134 Equifax Inc. EFX 
135 Edison International EIX 
136 EMC Corporation EMC 
137 Eastman Chemical Company EMN 
138 Emerson Electric Co. EMR 
139 EOG Resources, Inc. EOG 
140 Equity Office Properties Trust EOP 
141 El Paso Corporation EP 
142 Equity Residential EQR 
143 Express Scripts, Inc. ESRX 
144 Eaton Corporation ETN 
145 Entergy Corp. ETR 
146 Exelon Corporation EXC 
147 Ford Motor Company F 
148 FleetBoston Financial Corp FBF 
149 Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. FCX 
150 Family Dollar Stores FDO 
151 FedEx Corporation FDX 
152 FirstEnergy Corporation FE 
153 First Horizon National Corporation FHN 
154 Federated Investors, Inc. FII 
155 Fiserv, Inc. FISV 
156 Fifth Third Bancorp FITB 
157 Fluor Corporation FLR 
158 Forest Laboratories, Inc. FRX 
159 NICOR Inc. GAS 
160 Gannett Co., Inc. GCI 
161 General Dynamics Corporation GD 
162 Guidant Corporation GDT 
163 Golden West Financial GDW 
164 General Electric Company GE 
165 Genzyme Corporation GENZ 
166 Gilead Sciences, Inc. GILD 
167 General Mills Incorporated GIS 
168 Corning Incorporated GLW 
169 General Motors Corporation GM 
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170 Genuine Parts Company GPC 
171 Gap, Inc. (The) GPS 
172 Goodrich Corporation GR 
173 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (The) GS 
174 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. GT 
175 Gateway, Inc. GTW 
176 Grainger (W.W.), Inc. GWW 
177 Halliburton Company HAL 
178 Hasbro, Inc. HAS 
179 Huntington Bancshares, Inc. HBAN 
180 HCA Inc. HCA 
181 Manor Care, Inc. HCR 
182 Home Depot, Inc. HD 
183 Hartford Financial Services Group (The) HIG 
184 Hilton Hotels Corporation HLT 
185 Health Management Associates, Inc. HMA 
186 Heinz (H.J.) Company HNZ 
187 Honeywell International, Inc. HON 
188 Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide, Inc. HOT 
189 Hercules Incorporated HPC 
190 Hewlett-Packard Company HPQ 
191 Block (H&R), Inc. HRB 
192 HealthSouth Corporation HRC 
193 Hospira, Inc. HSP 
194 Hershey Foods Corporation HSY 
195 Humana Inc. HUM 
196 International Business Machines Corporation IBM 
197 International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. IFF 
198 International Game Technology IGT 
199 Intel Corporation INTC 
200 Intuit, Inc. INTU 
201 International Paper Company IP 
202 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. IPG 
203 Ingersoll-Rand Company IR 
204 ITT Industries, Inc. ITT 
205 Illinois Tool Works Inc. ITW 
206 Jabil Circuit, Inc. JBL 
207 Johnson Controls, Inc. JCI 
208 Penney (J.C.) Company, Inc. JCP 
209 JDS Uniphase Corporation JDSU 
210 John Hancock Financial Services JHF 
211 Johnson & Johnson JNJ 
212 Janus Capital Group, Inc. JNS 
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213 Jones Apparel Group, Inc. JNY 
214 Jefferson-Pilot Corporation JP 
215 Morgan (J.P.) Chase & Company JPM 
216 Nordstrom, Inc. JWN 
217 Kellogg Company K 
218 KB Home KBH 
219 KeyCorp KEY 
220 King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. KG 
221 KLA-Tencor Corporation KLAC 
222 Kimberly-Clark Corporation KMB 
223 Kerr-McGee Corporation KMG 
224 Kinder Morgan, Inc. KMI 
225 Coca-Cola Company KO 
226 Kroger Co. KR 
227 MBNA Corporation KRB 
228 Knight Ridder KRI 
229 KeySpan Corporation KSE 
230 Kohl's Corporation KSS 
231 Leggett & Platt, Inc. LEG 
232 Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings LH 
233 L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc. LLL 
234 Linear Technology Corp. LLTC 
235 Lilly (Eli) and Company LLY 
236 Lockheed Martin Corporation LMT 
237 Lincoln National Corporation LNC 
238 Lowe's Companies, Inc. LOW 
239 Louisiana-Pacific Corporation LPX 
240 LSI Logic Corporation LSI 
241 Limited, Inc. (The) LTD 
242 Lucent Technologies, Inc. LU 
243 Southwest Airlines Co. LUV 
244 Lexmark International, Inc. LXK 
245 Marriott International, Inc. MAR 
246 Masco Corporation MAS 
247 Mattel, Inc. MAT 
248 MBIA Inc. MBI 
249 McDonald's Corporation MCD 
250 McKesson Corporation MCK 
251 Moody's Corporation MCO 
252 Meredith Corporation MDP 
253 McDermott International, Inc. MDR 
254 Medtronic, Inc. MDT 
255 MedImmune, Inc. MEDI 
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256 Mercury Interactive Corporation MERQ 
257 Metlife, Inc. MET 
258 Medco Health Solutions, Inc. MHS 
259 McCormick & Company, Inc. MKC 
260 Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. MMC 
261 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company MMM 
262 Monster Worldwide, Inc. MNST 
263 Altria Group, Inc. MO 
264 Molex Incorporated MOLX 
265 Monsanto Company MON 
266 Merck & Co., Inc. MRK 
267 Marathon Oil Corporation MRO 
268 Microsoft Corporation MSFT 
269 M&T Bank Corporation MTB 
270 MGIC Investment Corporation MTG 
271 Micron Technology, Inc. MU 
272 MeadWestvaco Corporation MWV 
273 Maxim Integrated Products, Inc. MXIM 
274 Mylan Laboratories, Inc. MYL 
275 Navistar International Corporation NAV 
276 Nabors Industries, Ltd. NBR 
277 National City Corporation NCC 
278 NCR Corporation NCR 
279 Noble Corporation NE 
280 Newmont Mining Corporation NEM 
281 North Fork Bancorporation, Inc. NFB 
282 NiSource, Inc. NI 
283 NIKE, Inc. NKE 
284 Northrop Grumman Corporation NOC 
285 Novell, Inc. NOVL 
286 Norfolk Southern Corporation NSC 
287 Network Appliance, Inc. NTAP 
288 Northern Trust Corporation NTRS 
289 Nucor Corporation NUE 
290 NVIDIA Corporation NVDA 
291 Novellus Systems, Inc. NVLS 
292 Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. NWL 
293 Nextel Communications, Inc. NXTL 
294 New York Times Company NYT 
295 Office Depot, Inc. ODP 
296 Omnicom Group Inc. OMC 
297 OfficeMax, Inc. OMX 
298 Oracle Corporation ORCL 
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300 Palm, Inc. PALM 
301 Paychex, Inc. PAYX 
302 Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. PBG 
303 Pitney Bowes Inc. PBI 
304 PACCAR, Inc. PCAR 
305 PG&E Corporation PCG 
306 Plum Creek Timber Co. Inc. PCL 
307 Phelps Dodge Corporation PD 
308 Placer Dome Inc. PDG 
309 Public Service Enterprise Group, Incorporated PEG 
310 PepsiCo, Inc. PEP 
311 Pfizer, Inc. PFE 
312 Principal Financial Group, Inc. PFG 
313 Procter & Gamble Company PG 
314 Progress Energy, Inc. PGN 
315 Progressive Corporation (The) PGR 
316 Parker-Hannifin Corporation PH 
317 Pulte Homes, Inc. PHM 
318 PerkinElmer, Inc. PKI 
319 ProLogis PLD 
320 Pall Corporation PLL 
321 PMC-Sierra, Inc. PMCS 
322 Parametric Technology Corporation PMTC 
323 PNC Financial Services Group PNC 
324 Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW 
325 PPG Industries, Inc. PPG 
326 PP&L Corporation PPL 
327 Prudential Financial, Inc. PRU 
328 Pactiv Corporation PTV 
329 Providian Financial Corporation PVN 
330 Power-One, Inc. PWER 
331 Praxair, Inc. PX 
332 Qualcomm Inc. QCOM 
333 QLogic Corporation QLGC 
334 Ryder System, Inc. R 
335 Reynolds American, Inc. RAI 
336 Reebok International Ltd. RBK 
337 Rowan Companies, Inc. RDC 
338 Regions Financial Corp RF 
339 Robert Half International, Inc. RHI 
340 Transocean Sedco Forex, Inc. RIG 
341 Rohm and Haas Company ROH 
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342 Rockwell Automation, Inc. ROK 
343 Donnelley (R.R.) & Sons Company RRD 
344 RadioShack Corporation RSH 
345 Raytheon Company RTN 
346 Sears, Roebuck and Co. S 
347 Sanmina-SCI Corporation SANM 
348 Sapient Corporation SAPE 
349 Starbucks Corporation SBUX 
350 Siebel Systems, Inc. SEBL 
351 Sealed Air Corporation SEE 
352 Schering-Plough Corporation SGP 
353 Sherwin-Williams Company (The) SHW 
354 Sigma-Aldrich Corporation SIAL 
355 Schlumberger N.V. SLB 
356 SLM Corporation SLM 
357 Solectron Corporation SLR 
358 Snap-on Incorporated SNA 
359 Synovus Financial Corp. SNV 
360 Southern Company SO 
361 SouthTrust Corporation SOTR 
362 Simon Property Group, Inc. SPG 
363 Staples, Inc. SPLS 
364 Sempra Energy SRE 
365 SunTrust Banks, Inc. STI 
366 St. Jude Medical, Inc. STJ 
367 State Street Corporation STT 
368 Sunoco, Inc. SUN 
369 SUPERVALU Inc. SVU 
370 Stanley Works (The) SWK 
371 Safeway Inc. SWY 
372 Stryker Corporation SYK 
373 Symantec Corporation SYMC 
374 SYSCO Corporation SYY 
375 AT&T Corp. T 
376 TECO Energy, Inc. TE 
377 Teradyne, Inc. TER 
378 Target Corporation TGT 
379 Tenet Healthcare Corporation THC 
380 Tiffany & Company TIF 
381 Temple-Inland Inc. TIN 
382 TJX Companies, Inc. TJX 
383 Tellabs, Inc. TLAB 
384 Torchmark Corporation TMK 
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385 Thermo Electron Corporation TMO 
386 Thomas & Betts Corporation TNB 
387 T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. TROW 
388 Tupperware Corporation TUP 
389 Time Warner, Inc. TWX 
390 Texas Instruments Incorporated TXN 
391 Textron Inc. TXT 
392 Tyco International Ltd. TYC 
393 Unocal Corporation UCL 
394 Unisys Corporation UIS 
395 UnitedHealth Group, Inc. UNH 
396 UnumProvident Corp. UNM 
397 Union Pacific Corporation UNP 
398 United Parcel Service, Inc. UPS 
399 U.S. Bancorp USB 
400 United Technologies Corporation UTX 
401 Visteon Corporation VC 
402 VF Corporation VFC 
403 Valero Energy Corporation VLO 
404 Vulcan Materials Company VMC 
405 Verizon Communications VZ 
406 Walgreen Company WAG 
407 Waters Corporation WAT 
408 Wachovia Corporation WB 
409 Wendy's International, Inc. WEN 
410 Wells Fargo & Company WFC 
411 Whirlpool Corporation WHR 
412 WellPoint Health Networks, Inc. WLP 
413 Washington Mutual, Inc. WM 
414 Williams Companies, Inc. WMB 
415 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. WMT 
416 Worthington Industries, Inc. WOR 
417 Wrigley (Wm.) Jr. Company WWY 
418 Weyerhaeuser Company WY 
419 Wyeth WYE 
420 United States Steel Corporation X 
421 Xcel Energy, Inc. XEL 
422 XL Capital, Ltd. XL 
423 Xilinx, Inc. XLNX 
424 Exxon Mobil Corporation XOM 
425 Xerox Corporation XRX 
426 Yahoo! Inc. YHOO 
427 TRICON Global Restaurants, Inc. YUM 
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429 Zimmer Holdings, Inc. ZMH 
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Appendix 2: Tables 
 
Table 1: Correlation matrices of 2001-2005 financial data with one-year lagged CSR data and 
financial controls. 
 
All Firms 
                
  
Sales/A Sales/Emp Gross Profit  ROA Lag CSR 
Lag 
Assets 
Lag 
LD/A 
Lag 
Emp Lag Sales 
Sales/A 1                 
Sales/Emp 0.07** 1               
Gross 
Profit  (0.33)*** (0.15)*** 1             
ROA 0.18*** 0.03 0.19*** 1           
Lag CSR (0.07)** (0.12)*** 0.21*** 0.07** 1         
Lag Assets (0.22)*** 0.09*** 0.03 (0.06)* 0.11*** 1       
Lag LD/A (0.09)*** 0.02 (0.20)*** -0.04 (0.11)*** (0.09)*** 1     
Lag Emp 0.21*** (0.14)*** (0.14)*** 0.03 0.01 0.27*** 0.05* 1   
Lag Sales 0.17*** 0.23*** (0.18)*** 0.03 0.004 0.50*** (0.009) 0.73*** 1 
                    
Consumer Sector 
                
  
Sales/A Sales/Emp Gross Profit  ROA Lag CSR 
Lag 
Assets 
Lag 
LD/A 
Lag 
Emp Lag Sales 
Sales/A 1                 
Sales/Emp 0.04 1               
Gross 
Profit  (0.32)*** -0.09 1             
ROA 0.21*** 0.07 0.41*** 1           
Lag CSR (0.05) (0.11)* 0.11* 0.08 1         
Lag Assets (0.21)*** 0.21*** (0.13)** (0.21)*** (0.003) 1       
Lag LD/A (0.34)*** 0.01 (0.02) (0.33)*** 0.003 0.17*** 1     
Lag Emp 0.16*** (0.12)** (0.21)*** (0.06) (0.13)** 0.41*** 0.07 1   
Lag Sales 0.09 0.15** (0.22)*** (0.14)** (0.09) 0.79*** 0.08  0.83*** 1 
                    
Nonconsumer Sector 
              
  
Sales/A Sales/Emp Gross Profit  ROA Lag CSR 
Lag 
Assets 
Lag 
LD/A 
Lag 
Emp Lag Sales 
Sales/A 1                 
Sales/Emp 0.22*** 1               
Gross 
Profit  (0.34)*** (0.19)*** 1             
ROA 0.14*** 0.07* 0.19*** 1           
Lag CSR (0.10)*** (0.12)*** 0.23*** 0.06* 1         
Lag Assets (0.23)*** 0.06* 0.04 (0.04) 0.13*** 1       
Lag LD/A (0.10)*** 0.06* (0.23)*** (0.03) (0.15)*** (0.11)*** 1     
Lag Emp 0.09** (0.15)*** (0.13)*** (0.01) 0.13*** 0.46*** (0.01) 1   
Lag Sales 0.16*** 0.35*** (0.17)*** 0.05 0.05 0.55*** (0.08)** 0.64*** 1 
 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 
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Table 2: Industries in sample. 
 
Consumer Sector N Avg. CSR Score Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Consumer staple           
Food retailing 8 98.6 2.1 93 102 
Food beverage 17 99.2 3.2 93 109 
Household products 6 102.5 2.8 98 107 
Total consumer staple 31 99.7 3.2 93 109 
Consumer discretionary 
          
Automobiles 6 100.7 2.9 95 106 
Apparel 16 99.8 2.8 94 108 
Services 11 100.3 3.2 92 108 
Media 10 100.7 2.4 97 107 
Retailing 22 99.7 2.0 96 106 
Total consumer 
discretionary 65 100.1 2.6 92 108 
Nonconsumer Sector N Avg. CSR Score Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Energy 24 97.4 3.1 89 106 
Materials 33 99.3 2.7 93 108 
Industrials 54 99.3 3.1 90 108 
Healthcare 50 100.1 3.0 92 109 
Financials 67 100.7 2.3 95 107 
Technology 70 100.7 3.1 93 111 
Telecommunications 6 100.7 2.5 96 107 
Utilities 29 98.3 3.3 90 106 
Total Nonconsumer 333 99.8 3.1 89 111 
Total firms 429 99.8 3.0 89 111 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics. 
All firms  
Variable Firms Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CSR Score 429 99.8  3.0  89.0  111.0  
Sales 429 14,615.0  27,609.5  34.4  328,213.0  
Employees 429 49.6  101.5  0.1  1,800.0  
Total Assets 429 38,073.8  117,445.9  27.8  1,494,037.0  
ROA 429 0.0  0.1  (2.9) 0.5  
LD/Total Assets 429 0.2  0.1  0.0  0.9  
Sales/Assets 429 0.9  0.7  0.0  4.8  
Sales/Employees 429 435.5  489.2  10.2  4,561.9  
Gross Profit Percent 429 0.4  0.2  (0.3) 1.0  
Consumer Sector 
Variable Firms Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CSR Score 96 100.0  2.8  92.0  109.0  
Sales 96 20,203.8  38,483.6  92.3  313,335.0  
Employees 96 96.5  179.3  0.2  1,800.0  
Total Assets 96 20,890.7  55,844.3  82.0  479,921.0  
ROA 96 0.1  0.1  (0.1) 0.5  
LD/Total Assets 96 0.2  0.1  0.0  0.6  
Sales/Assets 96 1.4  0.8  0.1  4.0  
Sales/Employees 96 259.5  212.3  19.4  1,409.2  
Gross Profit Percent 96 0.4  0.2  0.0  0.8  
Nonconsumer Sector 
Variable Firms Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CSR Score 333 99.8  3.1  89.0  111.0  
Sales 333 12,884.5  22,977.3  34.4  328,213.0  
Employees 333 35.0  51.6  0.1  407.0  
Total Assets 333 43,394.4  130,321.3  27.8  1,494,037.0  
ROA 333 0.0  0.1  (2.9) 0.5  
Long-Term 
Debt/Total Assets 333 0.2  0.1  0.0  0.9  
Sales/Assets 333 0.7  0.6  0.0  4.8  
Sales/Employees 333 490.1  535.7  10.2  4,561.9  
Gross Profit Percent 333 0.4  0.2  (0.3) 1.0  
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Table 4: Main effects of CSR on CFP dependent variables for consumer and nonconsumer 
sectors, as well as consumer discretionary and consumer staple industries. 
 
  
Consumer Consumer Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staple Nonconsumer 
Dependent Variable: Sales/Assets         
Independent Variable: CSR Score (0.004) -0.006 0.0002 (0.028)*** 
Intercept 1.820  2.28 0.97 3.40*** 
  
        
Control Variables         
Lag Long-Term Debt/Total Assets (0.098)*** (0.120)*** (0.079)** (0.023)*** 
Lag Total Sales 0.105*** 0.053** 0.138* 0.015 
Lag Number of Employees (0.008) 0.005 0.011 0.030*** 
  
        
Observations 440 298 142 1421 
R squared 0.24 0.29 0.21 0.06 
  
        
  
Consumer Consumer Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staple Nonconsumer 
Dependent Variable: Sales/Employees         
Independent Variable: CSR Score (6.806)** (3.302) (4.56) (15.818)*** 
Intercept 1081.62*** 692.83* 885.64* 2030.74*** 
  
        
Control Variables         
Lag Long-Term Debt/Total Assets 3.058 8.752** (4.917) 1.232 
Lag Total Sales 85.572*** 79.528*** 134.64*** 203.416*** 
Lag Number of Employees (97.682)*** (91.400)*** (146.497)*** (209.916)*** 
  
        
Observations 440 298 142 1421 
R squared 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.49 
  
        
  
Consumer Consumer Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staple Nonconsumer 
Dependent Variable: Gross Profit 
Percentage         
Independent Variable: CSR Score 0.005* (0.004) 0.015*** 0.019*** 
Intercept 0.03 0.97** (0.85)* (1.18)*** 
  
  
  
    
Control Variables         
Lag Long-Term Debt/Total Assets (0.0003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.017)*** 
Lag Total Sales (0.010)** (0.014)** (0.057)*** (0.033)*** 
Lag Number of Employees (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 0.032** 0.004 
  
        
Observations 440 298 142 1421 
R squared 0.17 0.23 0.41 0.23 
 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 
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Table 5: Marginal effects of CSR on CFP dependent variables for consumer and nonconsumer 
sectors, as well as consumer discretionary and consumer staple industries. 
 
Model 1   
Dependent Variable: Sales/Assets   
Independent Variable: CSR Score (0.010) 
Interaction Variable: Nonconsumer * CSR Score (0.022) 
Intercept 2.204* 
  
  
Control Variables   
Nonconsumer Dummy Variable 1.536 
Lag Long-Term Debt/Total Assets (0.039)*** 
Lag Total Sales 0.036*** 
Lag Number of Employees 0.021* 
  
  
Observations 1861 
R squared 0.26 
  
  
Model 2   
Dependent Variable: Sales/Employees   
Independent Variable: CSR Score (4.024) 
Interaction Variable: Nonconsumer * CSR Score (12.248) 
Intercept   
  
  
Control Variables   
Nonconsumer Dummy Variable 1233.062 
Lag Long-Term Debt/Total Assets 2.157 
Lag Total Sales 175.836*** 
Lag Number of Employees (182.565)*** 
  
  
Observations 1861 
R squared 0.48 
  
  
Model 3   
Dependent Variable: Gross Profit Percentage   
Independent Variable: CSR Score 0.005 
Interaction Variable: Nonconsumer * CSR Score 0.014*** 
Intercept 0.1143 
  
  
Control Variables   
Nonconsumer Dummy Variable (1.402)*** 
Lag Long-Term Debt/Total Assets (0.013)*** 
Lag Total Sales (0.028)*** 
Lag Number of Employees (0.001) 
  
  
Observations 1861 
R squared 0.22 
 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 
